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NOT PLAYING GAMES: EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE TO
CERCLA CONTRIBUTION IN LIGHT OF AVIALL
Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals answered a question that the Supreme Court expressly
refused to address when given the opportunity. 2 The court of appeals was
forced to reverse precedent in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services3 regarding a liable party's rights
to partially recover costs incurred for an environmental cleanup. The
Eighth Circuit held that when a private party voluntarily cleans a site for
which it may be held liable, it may pursue recovery and contribution
actions under section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 4 against another liable
party.5 By opening the door for potentially liable parties to an action
previously unavailable, 6 the court of appeals was able to choose the best
post-Aviall alternative available in order to achieve CERCLA's
overarching goal of an effective and efficient cleanup.7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 11, 1980, Congress passed CERCLA in an attempt
"to 'encourage the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites' 8 and "'place
' 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter "Ad. Research Corp."].
2 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
3id.
4 Codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980), as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613, 1615 (2005).
5 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829.
6 See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998).
7 Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1995).
8 Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415
(8th Cir. 1990)).
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the cost of that response on those responsible for creating or maintaining
the hazardous condition."' 9 CERCLA effectively makes every party "who
contaminate[d] a site strictly liable for the costs of subsequent cleanup."' 0
CERCLA, in addition to allowing state and federal governments to
recover costs incurred, offers multiple methods for a private party to
recoup its costs."
Taking advantage of this private party provision in CERCLA,
Atlantic Research Corporation ("Atlantic") filed a complaint seeking
partial reimbursement from the United States for costs incurred in a
voluntary environmental cleanup.12 Atlantic was hired by the United
States to retrofit rocket motors in Atlantic's facility located in Camden,
Arkansas' 3 starting in 1981 and ending in 1986.14 The removal process of
the rocket propellant included the use of a high-pressure water spray that
Atlantic had on-site.15 Atlantic would then burn the propellant once it was
removed from the rocket motors.' 6 Atlantic's own investigation led to the
discovery that residue from the burnt rocket propellant eventualI
contaminated the soil and groundwater surrounding the Camden facility.
After reviewing its own investigation, Atlantic cleaned up the
contaminated area.18 Atlantic then brought the present action against the
United States in order to recover a portion of the costs incurred during the
9 Id. (quoting United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.
1992)).
0 At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 830. CERCLA effectuated this result by essentially
"transforn[ing] centuries of real property and tort liability law." Id.
" Id. CERCLA allows private parties to recover losses incurred during cleanup; first at
section 107(a)(4)(B), second under section 1 13(f)(1), and the third option being section
113(f)(3)(B). Id.
1 Id. at 829. Atlantic based its claim on CERCLA. Id.13 Id. Atlantic leased the Camden facility, located within the Highland Industrial Park,
from approximately 1979 until October 2003. Brief for Appellee at 9, Atl. Research
Corp. v. United States, No. 05-3152 (8th Cir. December 5, 2005).
14 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829. Atlantic claimed "it retrofitted over 3,200 rocket
motors by removing propellant that contained ammonium perchlorate ... and substituting
a different propellant in the motor." Brief for Appellee, supra note 12, at 9.
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clean up by citing CERCLA sections 107(a)19 and 113(f).20 Soon
thereafter, Atlantic and the United States began negotiations to reimburse
Atlantic for the cleanup costs identified in Atlantic's complaint.21
'9 Id. CERCLA § 107(a) states:
Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate;
"comparable maturity" date:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this sectionl-() the owner
and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who
by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment,
or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or
an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B)
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release; and (D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
20 Atl Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829. CERCLA § 113(f) states:
(1) Contribution: Any person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this
title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title
or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in
accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims,
the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in
this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action
for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of
this title or section 9607 of this title.
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Once the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,22 the United States ended
its negotiations with Atlantic. 2 3 The Supreme Court, in Aviall, held that a
party seeking contribution under section 113(f) could only do so "during
or following" a section 106 or section 107(a) CERCLA action.24 Because
there was no cause of action brought against Atlantic under either sections
106 or 107(a), Atlantic's section 113(f) contribution claim was barred.25
Atlantic attempted to rectify the problem created by Aviall by
amending its complaint to rely solely on section 107(a) and federal
common law.26 In response to the amended complaint, the United States
government moved to dismiss the claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), 27 arguing that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Dico,
Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co. 28 foreclosed Atlantic's section 107 claim. 29 In Dico,
the Eighth Circuit held that a liable party could not bring an action under
section 107.30 Following this holding, the district court agreed with the
government's assertion that Atlantic was barred from bringing a claim
under section 107 and granted the government's motion to dismiss. 3 1 Ever
persistent, Atlantic appealed to the Eighth Circuit arguing that its analysis
in Dico was undermined by the Supreme Court decision in Aviall.32
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
21 All. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829.
22 543 U.S. 157 (2004).23 Al. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829.24 Aviall, 543 U.S. at 160.
25 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829.
26 d
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). This rule states "failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted" warrants dismissal of the complaint. Id.
28 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003).
29 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 830.
30 Dico, 340 F.3d at 530. The Dico court reasoned that section 107 allowed complete
recovery from other parties, and a liable party should not be entitled to 100% recovery.
See Id. at 531.
' Atli. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 829-30.
32 Id. at 830. Atlantic raised the argument that "it is well settled that a panel may depart
from circuit precedent based on an intervening opinion of the Supreme Court that
undermines the prior precedent." Id. (quoting T.L. v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 960
(8th Cir. 2006)).
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's order to
dismiss Atlantic's claim, taking into consideration that the Supreme Court
had recently undermined Dico's rationale. 33 The Eighth Circuit ultimately
reversed the order of the district court. 34 In Atlantic, the Eighth Circuit
held that a private party that "voluntarily undertakes a cleanup for which it
may be held liable, thereby barring it from contribution under CERCLA's
[section] 113, may pursue an action for direct recovery or contribution
under [section] 107, against another liable party." 35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The interaction between CERCLA sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1) is
at the crux of the Atlantic decision.36 When CERCLA was first passed in
1980, it contained section 107(a), which currently "has a six-year statute
of limitations, and allows a plaintiff to recover 100% of its response costs
from [any] liable parties," regardless of whether the parties have settled
their CERCLA liability with the United States.37 Section 107(a) creates
four classes of potentially responsible persons ("PRPs") 38 and states that
PRPs shall be liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency plan."39
Litigation over section 107 quickly followed in an'attempt to determine if
CERCLA allowed a PRP who incurred cleanup costs to recover from
other PRPs.40 Numerous federal circuit courts determined that CERCLA
section 107 allowed a cause of action for private parties against other
n Id.
34 Id. at 837.
35 id.
Id. at 830.
" Id. at 831.
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The four classes are (1) current owners of facility, (2) past
owners that contaminated, (3) persons contracted to remove and/or dispose of
contaminants, and (4) persons accepting/accepted removal or disposal of contaminants.
Id.
39 Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). "The national contingency plan [sets forth] procedures for
preparing and responding to contaminate[d sites] and was [propagated] by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") pursuant to CERCLA § 105." Aviall, 543
U.S. at 161 n.2.
40 Aviall, 543 U.S. at 161.
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PRPs even if the private parties had incurred response costs voluntarily
and were not themselves subject to suit.4 1
Litigation also addressed the separate question of whether a private
party that had already been sued for cost recovery could seek contribution
from other PRPs.42 Since CERCLA, under its original enactment, did not
expressly address the issue of a right to contribution, the courts were left
to decide the question.43 Some courts found an implied right of
contribution from section 107" or as a matter of federal common law.45
Finding an implied right was questionable because the Supreme Court had
refused to recognize an implied right of contribution in the context of
other federal statutes.46
This litigation forced Congress to make changes to CERCLA,
which led to the enactment of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"). 47 SARA included an express
provision that allowed a cause of action for contribution, codified as
CERCLA section 113(f)(1). 48 Additionally, SARA also produced a
separate right of contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B) for a "person who
has resolved its liability to the United States or a state for some or all of a
response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement."49
41 See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890-892 (9th Cir. 1986);
Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317-318 (6th Cir. 1985); Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
42 Aviall, 543 U.S. at 162.
43 d
"4See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986);
Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
45 See United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-66 (D. Del. 1986);
Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486-1493 (D. Colo. 1985).
46 See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-647 (1981)
(finding no implied right for contribution in the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (finding no implied right
for contribution in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 nor Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
47 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613.
48 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
49 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
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Congress' intent in adding section 113 was to "clarify and
confirm" the right to CERCLA contribution.5 0 Congress also made the
express right of section 113 more restrictive than the right offered by
section 107.51 The right of contribution under section 113 is subject to a
three-year statute of limitations, plaintiffs can only recover costs
exceeding their equitable share, and plaintiffs cannot recover from a party
that has previously settled concerning the contamination in question.52
Essentially, SARA provided parties a right to cost recovery under
CERCLA in certain situations (section 107(a)) and separate rights of
contribution in other situations (sections 1 13(f)(1), 1 13(f)(3)(B)). 53
The addition of SARA in 1986 created an impasse between
sections 107 and 113.54 Courts realized that the newly amended CERCLA
created circumstances where plaintiffs might "quickly abandon section
113 in favor of the substantially more generous provisions of section 107,"
essentially rendering section 113 useless. 55 Courts went about attempting
to circumvent the problem by "directing traffic" between the two sections
of CERCLA.56 This effectively led courts to analyze sections 107 and 113
together, regardless of which CERCLA section the plaintiff claimed, in an
attempt to distinguish the sections.5 7 This resulted in courts effectively
reserving section 107 for "'innocent' plaintiffs who could assert one of the
statutory defenses to liability" and forcing all liable parties to use section
50 United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cit. 1994).
5' At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2006).
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(1)-(2), (g)(3).
5 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004).
54 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 832.
ss New Castle County v. Haliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,1123 (3d Cir. 1997).
56 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 832.
5Id.
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113.5 Therefore, CERCLA section 113 was not rendered void because the
courts implemented a restrictive reading of section 107.
A consequence of the court's system of forcing PRPs to use
section 113 was that section 113 was "available to all liable parties,
including those that had not faced a CERCLA action."60 Directly
preceding the Supreme Court's Aviall decision, the Eighth Circuit
published its own opinion in Dico which followed the precedent of
narrowly construing section 107. In Dico, the EPA forced Dico, Inc.,
and another liable party to clean up a contaminated site in Iowa.62 Dico
sued the other liable party for 100% of its costs under section 107 and
added a contribution claim under section 113.63 Because the other party
had previously settled with the EPA, the district court granted summary
judgment for the other party.64 Effectively, Dico could not sue the other
liable party under section 107 because Dico was also a liable party and it
could not sue under section 113 because the other party had previously
reached a settlement concerning the issue. 65
Then, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Aviall,
drastically changing the dynamics of the relationship between section 107
58 Id. (citing Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998).; Centerior
Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1998); Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1997); New
Castle County v. Haliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1997).;
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996);
United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Inds., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 99; Azko Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994)).
9 Id.
61 See Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003).
62 Id. at 527. "[T]richoloroethylene ... was detected in water coming from underground
wells located near the property owned by Dico. Id.
61 Id. Dico incurred $5.7 million in cleanup costs and brought suit against Shell Oil
Company, BP Products North America, Inc., Monsanto Company, Chevron Chemical
Company, and Bayer Corporation. Id.
6 Id. at 528. The EPA found the other group 39% responsible for the contamination and
invited both parties to start settlement negotiations. Id. at 527-28. Both were notified of
the liability protection that would result from a settlement, but Dico refused to settle. Id.
at 528.65 Id. at 527-32.
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and section 113.66 Aviall concerned a company, Aviall Services, Inc., that
performed an environmental cleanup but was never subject to a CERCLA
action.6 7 Aviall brought claims for cost recovery under section 107 and
contribution under section 113.6 After researching the courts' precedent,
Aviall amended its pleading seeking recovery only under section 113
assuming that the section 107 claim would be preserved in the section 113
claim.69 Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court interpreted section
113's "during or following" statement, indicating the "natural meaning of
this sentence is that contribution may only be sought subject to the
specified conditions, namely, 'during or following' a specified civil
action." 70 Therefore, a court that allowed a section 113 claim, without a
prior sections 106 or 107 action would make section 113's precondition
* 71void.7
Because Aviall directly undermined the Eighth Circuit's Dico
opinion, the Eighth Circuit found it necessary to address the issue in light
of the Aviall decision.72 The Eighth Circuit, under Atlantic, was able to
confront the issue of whether a liable party may recover costs advanced
beyond its equitable share "from another liable party in direct recovery, or
by section 107 contribution, or as a matter of federal common law." 73
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Atlantic, the Eighth Circuit examined whether CERCLA barred
a party that voluntarily cleaned up a site for which it was only partially
66 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).6 1Id. at 163-64. Aviall restored four aircraft engine maintenance sites in Texas and
sought to recover some of those costs from the previous owner Cooper Industries, Inc.
Id.68 Id. at 164. Aviall incurred at least $5 million in cleanup costs. Id.69 id.
'
0 Id. at 165-66. The Court found the "during or following" statement to create a
condition precedent for a § 113(f) claim. At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d 827, 833 (8th
Cir. 2006).
n' At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 833-34. The Court also expressly declined to address
the issue of whether Aviall could recover costs under § 107(a) even though it was a PRP.
Aviall, 543 U.S. at 584.
72 At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 833-37.
" Id. at 834.
359
Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No. 2
responsible from recovering any of its incurred costs from another liable
74party. Despite already having addressed this issue in previous cases,
such as Dico, the new precedent set forth in Aviall made it necessary for
the Eighth Circuit to tackle the issue again. In reviewing the instant case,
the court explicitly noted, "where the prior decision can be distinguished,
or its rationale has been undermined, a subsequent decision can depart
from the prior path." 75 The Eighth Circuit realized that when dealing with
Atlantic it must analyze the intertwined history of CERCLA sections 107
and 113 through the lens of a post-A viall microscope. 76
The Eighth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit is the only court
that has considered the question of whether a liable party can recover costs
incurred from cleanup from other liable parties under section 107 since the
Aviall decision.77 Like the Eighth Circuit, the Second Circuit's precedent
prior to Aviall would not allow a liable party to recover under section
107.78 Upon revisiting the issue post-Aviall, the Second Circuit concluded
that section 107 allowed a liable party to recover voluntarily incurred costs
for cleanup from another liable party.79
In light of Aviall's holding, the Eighth Circuit found the Second
Circuit's reasoning that it is no longer sensible to view section 113(f)(1) as
the only route available to liable parties seeking cleanup costs very
persuasive.80 The Eighth Circuit declared that if liable parties are able to
use section 113 (in pre-Aviall conditions), then they should be barred from
seeking contribution under section 107.81 However, Atlantic was barred
from using section 113 because Atlantic had not been sued under section
107, and thus the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit in
74 Id. at 829.
71Id. at 830.76 Id. at 830-31.
n Id. at 834.
78 Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1998).
7 Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F3d. 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). The Second
Circuit, in its reasoning, distinguished Edison from Bedford in coming out with
seemingly different conclusions. Id. at 100-01.
so Id. at 99. The court looked into § 107's language of "any other person" and found "no
basis for reading into this language a distinction between so-called 'innocent' parties and
parties [which] . . . would be held liable under section 107(a)." Id.
' Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 834-35.
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concluding that it does not make sense to bar liable parties from recovery
under section 107.82
The Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the concept of viewing
section 107 remedies "through a [section] 113 prism" as the circuit court
did previously in Dico.83 The Eighth Circuit rejected an approach that
"categorically deprives a liable party of a [section] 107 remedy." 84 The
court in Atlantic explicitly stated that parties may, "under appropriate
procedural circumstances," bring suit to recover costs incurred under
section 107.8
The Eighth Circuit went on to recognize the fact that section 107
allows a party to fully recover all costs incurred during cleanup. 86 Upon
first glance, section 107 may seem counterproductive to hold a liable party
(the party who cleaned the contaminated site) responsible for cleanup
costs if that party can recover 100% of the cleanup costs.87 In order to
extinguish these worries, the court "reaffirm[ed] Dico's holding that a
liable party may not use [section] 107 to recover its full response cost."88
The Eighth Circuit then looked at Congress' intent in passing
CERCLA.8 ' The Eighth Circuit concluded that "[c]ontribution is crucial to
CERCLA's regulatory scheme." 90 Following this conclusion, the court
cited Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,91 which stated, "'CERCLA is
82 Id.83 Id.
8 Id.
8 Id. The "appropriate procedural circumstances" are "parties who have incurred
necessary costs of response, but have neither been sued nor settled their liability under
sections 106 or 107. Id.86 Id.
87 id.
88 Id. The Eighth Circuit follows the Second Circuit in establishing the fact that
CERCLA is able to keep liable parties in check from full reimbursement by stating, "[i]f
a plaintiff attempted to use § 107 to recover more than its fair share or reimbursement, a
defendant would be free to counterclaim for contribution under § 113(f)." Id. (citing
Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F3d. 90, 100 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005)).
" Id. at 836. The Eighth Circuit stated, "[w]e discern Congress's intent by looking to
CERCLA's language, its legislative history, its underlying purpose and structure, and the
likelihood that Congress intended to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies."
Id.
90 5 1.
9' 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
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designed to encourage private parties to assume the financial
responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from
others."' 92 The Atlantic court found that when Congress passed section
113, its purpose was not to eliminate other methods of recovery because
section 113 states in its savings clause that "nothing in this subsection
shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action" under either sections 106 or 107. 1
The Eighth Circuit reached its holding by combining the CERCLA
language with the reasoning that if Congress wanted section 113 to
completely replace section 107 then it would have done so expressly. 94
Congress did not intend CERCLA to punish parties that voluntarily
cleaned up a contaminated site by categorically excluding them from a
right of contribution. 95 The Eighth Circuit deemed that this interpretation
is the only way to reconcile previous decisions "with CERCLA's goal of
encouraging prompt and voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites." 96 If the
court adopted the United States' reading of section 107, the United
States would be able to avoid liability by refusing to bring a CERCLA
action or refusing to allow a liable party to settle. 98
Due to the preceding reasoning, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a
private party that takes it upon itself to clean up a site for which it may be
liable, effectively barring it from contribution under section 113, is not
92 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 836 (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511
U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994)). The Eighth Circuit points to the fact that when Congress
looked at CERCLA in 1986, Congress "enacted an explicit right to contribution in
[section] 113 ... [which] reflects Congress's unambiguous intent to allow private parties
to recover in contribution." Id.
93 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000)). The Eighth Circuit supports this view by also
pointing towards § 113's legislative history that echoed "Congress's intention to clarify
and confirm, not to supplant or extinguish, the existing right to contribution." Id.
94 id.
9 Id. ("We discern nothing in CERCLA's words suggesting Congress intended to
establish a comprehensive contribution and cost recovery scheme encouraging private
cleanup of contaminated sites, while simultaneously excepting-indeed, penalizing-those
who voluntarily assume such duties.").
96 Id. (citing Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819, n.13).
9 A liable party is not able to use § 107 based on the simple fact that the party is liable
and not able to use § 113 until an action has been brought. See Brief for Appellee, supra
note 12, at 8-9.98 Atl Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 837.
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without remedy. 99 The liable party may file a section 107 claim against
another liable party for direct recovery or contribution. 00
V. COMMENT
After decades of litigation painted the prim rose path for various
claims under CERCLA, the Supreme Court blurred the lines of distinction
with its decision in Aviall. 01 The decision in Aviall has left many district
and circuit courts scrambling to reconcile cases and address one or more
of the unresolved issues left after the Aviall decision.102 The majority of
decisions since Aviall have focused on the issue of whether one PRP has
the ability to bring an action against another PRP under section 107 of
CERCLA."o Different district and circuit courts have handed down




101 See Carter E. Strang, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's Citizen Suits in
a Post-Cooper Era, 53 FED. LAW. 26 (Jul. 2006) ("The U.S. Supreme Court shook the
world of environmental law with its decision in Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall Services
Inc."); David M. Winfrey, Recovering From Cooper: Assessing Damage, Decisions and
New Directions After Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., SL063 ALI-ABA
191 (2006) ("[T]he decision left little certainty within the PRP community as to grounds
for PRPs to base a contribution and/or cost recovery action."); Richard 0. Faulk &
Cynthia J. Bishop, There and Back Again: The Progression and Regression of
Contribution Actions Under CERCLA, 18 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 323, 337 (2005). Faulk and
Bishop state:
We also have returned [from the Aviall decision] with something quite
unexpected and, indeed, something that upsets traditional and settled
expectations-something that threatens the fabric so carefully
developed to allocate environmental liabilities equitably among
responsible parties-and something that, for almost twenty years,
worked to promote the protection of our nation's environment.
Id..
102 Winfrey, supra note 100, at 196.
1o3 Id. at 196. See also Michael David Lichtenstein & Priya R. Masilamani, Recent
Developments in Toxic Torts and Environmental Law, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J.
755, 767 (2006); Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role
oFederal Law In Private Cleanup Costs Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 50 (2006).
Winfrey, supra note 100, at 196.
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One approach that district courts have taken post-Aviall is to hold
that a PRP has no right to seek contribution under section 107(a).,os It is
readily apparent that these district courts have approached these cases by
following their respective circuit courts' precedent, while simultaneously
asking them to review the precedent in light of Aviall.106 The most
reasonable explanation district courts state regarding why circuit courts
should overrule the relevant precedent'0 7 is that "the government could
insulate itself from responsibility for its own pollution by simply declining
to bring a CERCLA cleanup action or refusing a liable party's offer to
settle." o0 This result would certainly be counterproductive to CERCLA's
intention to "'encourage the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites"'l
09
and "'place the cost of that response on those responsible for creating or
maintaining the hazardous condition.""'10 The problem with this
alternative is straightforward and, therefore, shows this option is an
inefficient and uneconomical way to address the issue left by Aviall.
A second alternative courts have taken is when a PRP has a section
107(b) defense available,"' the PRP is deemed "innocent" and can pursue
105 See Montville Twp. v. Woodmont Builders, LLC., 2005 WL 2000204 (D. N.J. Aug.
17, 2005) (relying upon pre-Aviall Third Circuit precedent that only innocent parties can
sue under section 107, thus barring a PRP claim.); Mercury Mall Assoc., Inc. v. Nick's
Market, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Va. 2005) (following Fourth Circuit law, but
stating that the Fourth Circuit should review case as a result of the Aviall decision); City
of Waukesha v. Viacom Inter., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (following
Seventh Circuit law stating only innocent parties can sue under section 107).
106 Winfrey, supra note 100, at 197 n.al ("[S]ome district courts . .. have taken a 'hands
tied' approach.").
107 See Mercury Mall Assoc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 513.
08 At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d 827, 837 (8th Cir. 2006).
' Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th
Cir. 1990)).
0 Id. (quoting United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 478, 486 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
.' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000):
There shall be no liability . . . for a person . . . who can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that . . . the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
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a section 107 claim.1 2 These decisions recognize the fact that a PRP may
be left without a judicial remedy if not allowed to assert a section 107
claim. One problem with this approach, as with the first approach, is that
there would still be instances in which the government could insulate itself
from responsibility by not bringing an action and refusing settlement when
a PRP did not have a section 107(b) defense available.'" 3 Still, in other
circumstances, this approach would virtually render section 113 void. 114In
these instances, a PRP that permitted the three-year limitation period
allowed under section 113 to expire"' 5 could take advantage of the more
generous provisions allowed under section 107.116 The numerous
inadequacies with this "middle of the road" approach show that it is not
the most desirable path for courts or the parties.
The third alternative courts could adopt as post-Aviall precedent is
the approach taken by Atlantic117 in allowing a PRP the right to seek
a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a
published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by
rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such
hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances,
and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result
from such acts or omissions; or (4) any combination of the foregoing
paragraphs.
112 City of Rialto v. United States Dep't of Def., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26941 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 16, 2005).
"' Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 837.
H 4 New Castle County v. Haliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1123 (3d Cir. 1997).
11 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1):
Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), no action may be
commenced for damages (as defined in section 9601(6) of this title)
under this chapter, unless that action is commenced within 3 years after
the later of the following: (A) [t]he date of the discovery of the loss and
its connection with the release in question [or] (B) [t]he date on which
regulations are promulgated under section 9651(c) of this title.
11642 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
"' At!. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 837.
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contribution under section 107. 18 Absent any Congressional amendment
to CERCLA,"' the Eighth Circuit's decision in Atlantic appears to be the
most efficient and effective alternative for courts to follow.
The Eighth Circuit's internal logic for determining its holding in
Atlantic was based soundly upon the altered landscape of post-Aviall
environmental law. The Eighth Circuit used common sense to determine
that it was no longer sensible to allow section 113 to be a PRP's exclusive
remedyl21 and found that a plain reading of section 107 permitted
Atlantic's recovery because Atlantic was "any other person."' 22 The
Eighth Circuit also thwarted critics' main concern when it addressed the
issue of total cost recovery under section 107.123 The Eighth Circuit
pointed out that if a plaintiff attempted to recover more than its fair share,
it would be open to a counterclaim by the defendant and, therefore, the
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed Dico's holding that a liable party may not use
118 For cases in which courts have chosen this alternative, see Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI
Utils., Inc., 423 F3d. 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (PRP conducting voluntary cleanup may seek
contribution under section 107(a)); Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 2005 WL 1902849
(D.D.C. Jul. 19, 2005) (Finding that a 'plain reading' of section 107 permits recovery by
'any other person' and that the result was supported by the policy goal of encouraging
cleanups); Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co. of N. Cal., 2005 WL 1417152 (E.D. Cal. June 16,
2005) (Finding under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent); Metro. Water Reclamation
Dist. Of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. 111. 2005)
(Relying on 'any other person' language in section 107 and the policy goals of
CERCLA); Vine St. LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
119 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515, 543 (3d Cir. 2006)
("the debate over whether our national environmental cleanup laws should favor prompt
and effective cleanups in any manner ... or should favor settlements and other
enforcement actions ... is a matter for Congress, not our Court.").
120 Donn L. Calkins, CERCLA Contribution Actions After Cooper v. Aviall, 34 COLO.
LAW. 99, 103 (Sept. 2005). Calkins states:
Further, any fine-tuning of the rights afforded by [section] 107 or
[section] 113 likely will come from the courts rather than from
Congress. Legislative fixes to CERCLA are rare, time-consuming, and
contentious. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, practitioners will
need to keep a close eye on cases making their way through the courts
to determine the shape of CERCLA contribution actions.
Id.
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section 107 to recover its full response costs.' 24 The last point covered by
the Eighth Circuit addressed section 113's savings clause and stated that
Congress' enactment of section 113 reflected no intent to eliminate other
rights of contribution available to a party.125 Using this line of reasoning,
the Eighth Circuit built a solid foundation of new CERCLA precedent
upon the unsettled territory of post-Aviall environmental law.
There are several results and ramifications that flow from the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Atlantic, which shows the Eighth Circuit
chose the most effective and efficient alternative available. One major
ramification, from which other, smaller results flow, is the fact that
allowing PRPs to sue under section 107 achieves CERCLA's goal of
providing fast and effective cleanups of contaminated sites.126 A PRP
facing the decision of whether to voluntarily clean up a contaminated area
or wait until forced to clean the site by a government agency would
understandably be hesitant to voluntarily clean the site if the PRP faced
the possibility of not being able to recover its costs under CERCLA. 127
Any incentive to hold-off government enforcement of clean up does not
work towards CERCLA's goal of timely cleanups.12 8 However, after the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Atlantic, PRPs no longer have to worry about
the possibility of not having their days in court because they are allowed
to bring suit under section 107.129
'
2 4 Id. at 835.
125 Id. at 836.
126 Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1995).
127 Aronovsky, supra note 102, at 53-54. Aronovsky states:
A PRP incurring cleanup costs at a site faces a series of difficult
choices in light of Aviall: (1) Should the PRP make no change in its
behavior and assume that the court of appeals will reverse prior
decisions and hold that a PRP may bring a section 107(a) claim? (2)
Should the PRP refuse "voluntarily" to comply with a regulatory
agency cleanup order and wait to be sued under section 106 (in the rare
instance that EPA is involved in the site and issues an administrative
order) or section 107(a) in order to obtain CERCLA cost contribution
from other PRPs? (3) Should the PRP try to negotiate a settlement with




2 9 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 837.
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Even in instances in which cleanup has already occurred, the
Eighth Circuit's decision offers the best option to facilitate a timely
resolution to party liability when compared to the other alternatives.13 0
Once a PRP has cleaned a toxic waste site, the PRP will likely seek a
settlement in order to recoup a portion of the costs. At this point, the
Eighth Circuit's suggestion that any other alternative would allow the
government to insulate itself from liability by not bringing an action and
refusing settlement' 3 1 becomes extremely relevant. A government agency
facing the decision of whether to remain a mere bystander, which will not
bring liability, or negotiate a settlement, which will open claims for
contribution, will be inclined not to approach the negotiating table.' 32
Thus, "a PRP seeking to settle with a [governmental] agency in order to
trigger [any] contribution rights often will lack negotiating power" under
the other alternatives.133 PRPs that are put in this disadvantageous position
may be forced to accept unproductive terms if they are even able to get the
agency to the negotiating table.134
In an Atlantic jurisdiction, PRPs are given the powerful tool of
increased leverage in negotiations with government agencies. 135 If the
government does not want to play fair, then a PRP can resolve the issue
effectively and efficiently by bringing the government into court under a
section 107 claim.136 Governments facing the alternative of negotiating
agreeable terms with a PRP versus the possibility of owing a higher
amount announced by judicial decree have an incentive to bring the
situation to a timely conclusion.137
Atlantic's decision creates the incentive for a timely conclusion,
which is an effective way to achieve one of CERCLA's primary
objectives. 138 One of the main problems that arise under the other
130 See Winfrey, supra note 100; Aronovsky, supra note 102, at 33; but see Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Atl. Research Corp., No. 06-562 (Oct. 24, 2006).
131 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 837.
132 See generally Winfrey, supra note 100.
133 Aronovsky, supra note 102, at 57.
134 id.
135 See generally id.136 At. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 836-37.
137 See generally Aronovsky, supra note 102.138 Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1995).
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alternatives that the Eighth Circuit rejected is that they effectively force
one party to wait for the other party to move. 39 This waiting game slows
down the process considerably and may not lead to a conclusion at all.140
However, the overall effect of Atlantic's decision to allow PRPs the right
to sue under section 107 will eventually show that Atlantic's solution
allows PRPs and other parties involved to become proactive in the cleanup
of contaminated sites and effectuate efficient and effective allocations of
costs to those parties responsible.'41
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Aviall, the Eighth
Circuit correctly identified the pitfalls presented in the environmental law
landscapel 42 and took the best plan of action available. The other
alternatives available to the courts were ones in which the government
would be allowed to adequately shield itself from possible liability against
PRPS.143 Additionally, the other alternatives do not provide a means in
which contaminated sites will be promptly and efficiently cleaned,'"
which is the main goal of CERCLA.145 The Eighth Circuit's decision in
Atlantic accomplishes CERCLA's goal and holds the government
accountable for its liability by allowing a PRP to pursue an action under
section 107 against another liable party.146
VI. CONCLUSION
Atlantic answered a question that many circuit courts will soon
have to address in light of Aviall. The Eighth Circuit takes an approach
that does not allow the government to shield itself from potential liability.
The decision also maintains section 113's viability while preventing
'
39 Aronovsky, supra note 102, at 55 ("[S]ome commentators suggested that PRPs delay
cleanups and wait for a government agency to initiate enforcement litigation as a trigger
for section 113(f)(1) contribution rights .... [This] would seem inconsistent with the
foal of encouraging prompt, efficient cleanups.").
o0 Id. at 53-54; Winfrey, supra note 100, at 195.
141 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 836.
142 Id. at 834-37.
143 Id. at 837.
144 Aronovsky, supra note 102, at 55.
145 Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1995).
146 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 837.
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section 107 from overwhelming it. The alternative chosen by the Eight
Circuit does not present the problem of 100% cost recovery because
section 107 allows defendants to counterclaim against an overreaching
plaintiff. Nor does the court's approach allow parties to play a waiting
game in order to see which party will act first in the cleanup process.
Furthermore, the decision by the circuit court essentially levels the playing
field for parties that wish to negotiate a settlement without judicial
intervention. Conclusively, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's holding
that a potentially liable party may pursue an action for recovery or
contribution under CERCLA section 107 best allows CERCLA to achieve
its goal of prompt, effective cleanups of contaminated sites.
ROBERT CORNEJO
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